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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, the use of biologically based (neurological, neuropsychological, 
genetic) evidence in criminal trials as support for claims of mental impairments among 
offenders has increased in popularity. However, research on how exposure to those 
arguments affects jury decision-making remains unclear. Specifically, arguments rooted 
in biology sometimes mitigate and sometimes aggravate judgments of criminal 
responsibility for mentally ill offenders, and this discrepancy seems to stem from the 
specific conditions by which that disorder was acquired. The following study’s aim was 
to uncover the precise mechanism(s) behind this elusive effect. Utilizing a 2x2 between 
subjects experimental design, participants were presented with a hypothetical crime 
summary involving an offender with either an onset controllable or uncontrollable mental 
disorder.  Ratings of criminal responsibility and other variables hypothesized to function 
as mediators were obtained after presentation of a prime supporting either a biologically 
deterministic or free will argument for human behavior in general. Results indicated that 
when the defendant’s disorder was the result of the his own actions (onset controllable), a 
biological prime decreased judgments of criminal responsibility; however, when the 
disorder was caused by factors out of his control (onset uncontrollable), the prime 
increased judgments of criminal responsibility. An examination of several possible 
mechanisms finds the effect mediated by the perception of control the defendant could 
have had over his own actions at the time of the crime. These results suggest that 
perceptions of behavioral control are an important contributor to jurors’ formation of 
criminal responsibility judgments when an offender possesses a mental illness; and 
arguments advocating a biological basis for human behavior reliably affect blame 
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attribution, suggesting that a societal shift in the perception of free will as a result of 
increased exposure to biology in general may alter the framework of criminal 
responsibility judgments. 
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Introduction 
 
The use of various types of neuroscientific and biological evidence are gaining in 
popularity within the legal system. Advances in neuroscience, neuroimaging, 
neuropsychological testing and genetic research has allowed the fields of biology and 
psychology to intertwine and collaboratively present themselves as evidence during 
various stages within the legal system, most notably in criminal cases. Their specific uses 
vary across many contexts within criminal law, ranging from arguing competency, 
mental state, demonstrating brain damage, and propensities for mental illnesses. Many 
scholars argue that technologies such as neuroimaging or neuropsychological testing help 
to demonstrate the physical basis for certain impairments that until recently were 
classified as psychological in nature (Jones & Ginther, 2015), yet plenty others caution 
the use of such technology in criminal courts, claiming they have unfairly prejudicial 
effects on jurors or lack the relevant capabilities to address questions for which they 
claim to have answers.  
Even still, the use of neuroscientific evidence, whether genetic, biological, 
neurological or neuropsychological in nature, is growing in the US and abroad. For 
instance, Farahany (2016) reported that the number of times such evidence was discussed 
by judges within the US criminal appeals courts almost tripled between 2005 and 2012. 
This increase in exposure to biologically based explanations for behavior is likely to 
affect how jurors and lay persons perceive the ability of humans to make autonomous 
decisions without the interference of factors beyond their control. For example, recent 
research suggests that knowledge of neuroscience can alter perceptions of free will and in 
turn affect punishment attribution (Shariff et al., 2014). The current study seeks to clarify 
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how more biologically deterministic arguments could affect responsibility attributions 
when a criminal offender is mentally ill—a common situation encountered by jurors in 
criminal court contexts—and how the details on the offender’s disorder onset alter these 
attributions.   
Neuroimage Bias 
Typically in criminal proceedings, an expert witness is asked by either the 
prosecution or defense to present evidence to jurors that is meant to speak to the 
perceived guilt of the offender.  Recently, advancements in neuroimaging technology 
have resulted in scientists presenting brain scans depicting neural anomalies as evidence 
of various neurological or psychological conditions. This influx of neuroscientific 
evidence created worry among legal scholars of its possible biasing nature and 
subsequent effects on juror decision-making, specifically in regards to brain imaging and 
the recent development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Compared to 
other images, fMRI scans are particularly bright and visually appealing, and these 
potentially dazzling effects resulted in what was referred to as the “Christmas Tree 
effect” (Gibbons, 2007; Dumit, 1999). This effect suggested that the visual allure of 
neuroimages would result in persuasion of jurors by any information provided to them 
alongside that image, despite the image’s relevance or accuracy (Feigenson, 2006; 
Weisberg et al., 2008; Weisberg et al., 2015). In other words, because of the lack of 
scientific knowledge most jurors possess and the fact that neuroscientific explanations 
sound credible and valid, some scholars worry that any sham argument could be veiled 
under a neuroscientific explanation and assumed to be true by jurors (Baker et al., 2015; 
Brown & Murphy, 2009; Choe, 2014).  
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As a result of these concerns, many scientists turned their attention to the 
implications of presenting neuroimages on juror decision-making, and evidence of a 
neuroimage bias did in fact emerge. For example, McCabe and Castel (2008) asked 
participants to rate the scientific validity of articles summarizing both phony and real 
scientific research findings, presented alongside either: a neuroimage, bar graph, 
topographical map, or no image. Across three studies, utilizing both between and within 
subjects designs, the authors found that participants rated research as more scientifically 
valid when it was accompanied by a brain image compared to when it was presented with 
no image, a bar graph, or a topographical map, regardless if the articles contained 
accurate scientific reasoning or not. Additionally, Weisberg et al. (2008) tested the effect 
of phony neuroscience explanations for both good and bad descriptions of psychological 
phenomena on participant ratings of satisfaction for each statement. The authors found 
that the inclusion of irrelevant neuroscience explanations encouraged participants to view 
poor descriptions more favorably than they did without neuroscience explanations. An 
explanation for these findings provided by both McCabe & Castel and Wesiberg et al. 
was that people may have a natural affinity for reductionist explanations for behavior or 
psychological phenomena; therefore, physical representations of such phenomena, i.e. 
neuroscientific explanations, are more satisfying than abstract representations for the 
same phenomenon. 
Although researchers initially uncovered early evidence of a neuroimage bias, 
other more recent work struggles to identify such an effect (Schweitzer et al., 2013; West 
et al., 2014; Marshall et al., 2017). For example, in a series of five experiments, 
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Schweitzer et al. (2013) sought to replicate the findings that suggested a neuroimage bias, 
and identify the specific conditions most likely to elicit this bias. In their first study, 
participants were presented with one of three scenarios describing an alleged link 
between a particular mental condition and a resulting behavior: idiopathic brain defect, 
neurotoxin resulting in brain damage, or brain damage as a result of past drug use. In 
support of these assertions, the scenarios were presented alongside either a brain image or 
a graph. Ratings of argument believability indicated no differences between the brain 
image and the graph conditions. In the next three experiments, designed to more closely 
resemble McCabe and Castel’s 2008 study, participants were presented with one of two 
fictitious scientific news articles accompanied by either a brain image or bar graph. 
Across all three studies, results revealed no differences in ratings of persuasion or 
credibility between the image and the graph conditions. In a final study, utilizing a within 
subjects design, Schweitzer et al. found that only when participants read both an article 
summary containing a neuroimage and one that did not contain an image did an effect of 
image presence emerge: the article containing an image was rated as more credible than 
the article without the image.  
Despite multiple attempts to replicate the neuroimage bias uncovered by previous 
researchers, based on this study there may only be very specific instances that elicit such 
a bias, if it exists at all. Schweitzer at el. suggest that a possible explanation for their 
failure to replicate previous work that indicated a neuroimage bias is that in the five years 
following Weisberg et al. (2008) and McCabe and Castel’s (2008) experiments, people 
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became more exposed to neuroscience, and thus the persuasion along with the novelty of 
such technology dulled.  
Farah and Hook (2013) make note of flaws in McCabe and Castel’s study design, 
noting that the authors compared fMRI images to a topographical graph and bar chart that 
were assumed to contain the same amount of relevant information, however they do not. 
Participants may have found fMRI images to be more persuasive and scientifically valid 
because they convey more meaningful information, not because they have more visual 
appeal. Michael et al. (2013) also offer evidence against a neuroimage bias, after 
attempting to replicate McCabe and Castel (2008) and Weisberg et al.’s (2008) studies 
across ten experiments and using almost 2000 participants. Michael et al. suggests that, in 
regards to McCabe and Castel’s experiment, statistically the results do not support a 
neuroimage bias when closely observing effect size and confidence intervals, and note 
the original work was exaggerated by its authors and other scholars.  
In another attempt to uncover a biasing effect of neuroscientific information, West 
et al. (2014) compared neuroscientific lie detection evidence (either in the form of brain 
waves, a brain map, or no image) to a behavioral lie detection method (the Reid 
technique) to explore any differences in participants’ assigned verdicts. Participants who 
provided a guilty verdict rated the neuroscientific evidence more highly in questions 
regarding quality and influence of the expert compared to the behavioral expert. 
However, the author reported no difference in the proportion of guilty vs. not guilty 
verdicts assigned between participants who were given neuroscientific evidence versus 
behavioral evidence, nor was there a difference in the confidence ratings of assigned 
	 6	
verdicts. In a similar study, McCabe and Castel (2011) tested the effects of fMRI lie 
detection evidence on juror decision-making, manipulating whether participants were 
given a statement challenging the validity of fMRI or not. Results indicated that, 
compared to the polygraph and thermal imaging evidence, guilty verdicts were 
significantly more likely when fMRI evidence was presented. However, when the 
scientific validity of fMRI was questioned, the number of guilty verdicts assigned was no 
different than the control condition with no evidence presented. As the opposing counsel 
in an actual trial situation would most likely challenge the scientific validity of 
neuroimaging technology if it presented as evidence, these results may capture how 
jurors would respond to such evidence in criminal courts.  
Scurich and Shniderman (2014) provide an explanation for why neuroscientific 
evidence may appear to be more persuasive in certain circumstances. The researchers 
presented participants with an argument either supporting or not supporting the use of the 
death penalty, which was accompanied by neuroscientific evidence supplementing that 
argument. Results indicated that participants rated the argument sound and the 
neuroscience persuasive only when the argument supported their prior beliefs on the 
topic, and returned negative evaluations when it frustrated their beliefs.  The authors posit 
that when presented with scientific information, individuals employ motivated reasoning 
to evaluate credibility. This theory suggests that information is assimilated in a manner 
biased toward reaching a particular outcome or one that supports already held beliefs. 
Motivated reasoning may provide an explanation for a bias toward neuroscience 
information in scenarios when the participants have a priori motivations to reach a 
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particular outcome, such as in Scurich and Shniderman’s study where the argument 
involved a loaded social issue: the death penalty. In this scenario, it is possible that 
participants judged the neuroscientific information in a manner that was consistent with 
these desired outcomes. However, in other scenarios where the arguments do not incite 
strongly held beliefs, such as scenarios presenting fictitious scientific methods or 
discoveries as observed in many previously discussed experiments, it is doubtful that 
participants use motivated reasoning in the manner Scurich and Shniderman suggest.  It is 
likely then that motivated reasoning can only be appropriately used as an explanation for 
assessing argument credibility, neuroscience or not, when the argument is relevant 
enough to the observer to activate a priori motivations.  
Mental illness and neuroscience 
As a common platform for admitting neuroscientific evidence in criminal cases is 
for the support of claims of neurological impairments that lead to the development of 
severe mental illness, it is intuitively utilized with the hopes of lessening the offender’s 
criminal and moral responsibility for the crime and therefore reducing sentence severity. 
As such, research has suggested it has this intended effect (Aspinwall, 2012; Capestany 
& Harris, 2014; Farahany, 2016; Greene & Cahill, 2011; Gurley & Marcus, 2008; 
Schweitzer et al., 2013). In a sample of U.S. appellate court cases utilizing neuroscientific 
evidence between 2005-2012, Farahany (2016) reported that for 23% of capital cases, 
there was an at least partially positive outcome, defined as a reversal, remand, or 
modification to some component of the trial courts’ decision in the defendant’s favor. In 
general, the likelihood of such outcomes in capital appeals cases is about 19% overall, 
	 8	
suggesting a slight improvement in the current sample. For non-capital cases, positive 
outcomes occurred in 20% of the sample, compared to average success rates of about 
10% in appeals cases overall. These comparisons demonstrate that the use of 
neuroscientific evidence offers an improvement on the likelihood of a positive appeals 
outcome, but even more so for non-capital cases.   
Within the realm of experimental research, similar outcomes are observed. Gurley 
and Marcus (2008) found that presenting a neuroimage supporting a psychotic disorder 
diagnosis in the form of expert testimony significantly increased the odds of mock jurors 
finding the defendant Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI), compared to testimony 
without a neuroimage. Greene and Cahill (2011) found that for defendants rated by 
participants as a high risk for future dangerousness, both neuropsychological test results 
and neuroimages supporting a diagnosis of psychosis mitigated sentencing 
recommendations compared to when no supporting information was provided. Similarly, 
a study by Aspinwall (2012) involved asking judges to assign punishment for a 
hypothetical assault case involving an offender who is diagnosed as psychopathic. In one 
condition, judges were presented with a biologically based explanation (biomechanism) 
for the defendant’s mental illness, in this case a genetic variation of the MAOA gene that 
results in a propensity for developing psychopathy, while another condition had no 
biological explanation. The study found that presenting judges with a biomechanism 
supporting a diagnosis of psychopathy resulted in more lenient judgments of criminal 
responsibility compared to a psychopathy diagnosis presented without a biomechanism. 
The results also revealed that the number of judges who listed mitigating factors doubled 
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when the biomechanism was present. Examples of commonly reported mitigating factors 
included mentioning that “the defendant was mentally ill and lacked control over his 
actions, therefore was less legally culpable”, and the fact that just as some people are 
physically disabled, psychopaths may be morally disabled because of their neurological 
inability to feel empathy.  
Other research suggests these effects are nuanced depending on the specific 
disorder possessed by the offender (Saks et al., 2014, Gurley and Marcus 2008). For 
example, Saks et al. (2014) conducted an experiment where mock jurors were presented 
with a fictitious case summary detailing a capital murder case for an offender either 
diagnosed with psychopathy, schizophrenia or normal. The type of evidence presented 
supporting the offender’s diagnosis varied (clinical, genetic, neurological with image, 
neurological without image), as well as offender dangerousness (high, low), and 
proponent of the expert evidence (prosecution, defense). The authors found that 
presenting a neuroimage resulted in fewer death penalty recommendations for 
psychopaths, but the effect was the opposite for schizophrenics, where the neuroimage 
resulted in an increase in death sentence recommendations. This effect was only present 
when the offender was classified as dangerous; when dangerousness was low the effect 
was not statistically significant. Similarly, Gurley and Marcus (2008) found that 
defendants diagnosed with a psychotic disorder were more likely to be found NGRI 
compared to those diagnosed with psychopathy. As indicated by these inconsistent 
results, there are clearly unanswered questions regarding how neuroscientific information 
affects legal decision making for mentally ill offenders.  
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 Presenting evidence of a biological basis for mental disorders produces 
arguments designed to reduce criminal intent and responsibility, with the ultimate goal to 
reduce judgments of guilt or mitigate sentencing. However, that evidence also introduces 
questions of disorder stability, permanence, recidivism and future dangerousness, which 
are aggravating in nature. This combination of mitigating and aggravating factors as a 
result of presenting a biological explanation for a disorder (biomechanism) is known as 
the “double-edged sword phenomenon.” As an example of this phenomenon, Aspinwall’s 
2012 study found that though the number of mitigating factors provided by judges 
increased after introduction to the disorder biomechanism (MAOA gene variation) so did 
mentions of balancing aggravating and mitigating factors. For example, judges may have 
mentioned that although the defendant was severely mentally ill, the presence of a 
biological basis for their illness suggests that they are not likely to recover and are also 
likely to reoffend in the future.  
Cheung and Heine (2015) also provided research to support the double-edged 
sword phenomenon. After presenting participants with either a genetic or environmental 
explanation for criminal behavior, the authors utilized a path analysis to explore 
judgments of responsibility and predict sentencing outcomes. Results indicated that 
genetic explanations led to lower perceptions of conscious behavioral control, predicting 
reduced sentencing recommendations compared to the environmental explanations. 
However, the genetic arguments also resulted in greater expectations of reoffending, 
predicting increased sentencing recommendations. As suggested by the study’s results, 
Cheung and Heine discussed that genetic explanations for criminal behavior force people 
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to concurrently consider and reconcile both aggravating and mitigating arguments. 
Cheung and Heine note that these two opposing points may not neutralize each other, 
with one weighing more heavily than the other in certain circumstances that could 
perhaps revolve around one’s own philosophical beliefs about retributivism vs. 
rehabilitative punishment, but that for now remain unclear.  
Free will beliefs  
As neuroscientific and biological information has steadily increased in popularity 
among legal scholars and practitioners, so too has it’s familiarity to the general public. 
This augmented understanding and exposure of the biological bases of human behavior, 
by nature, challenges opinions about free will (Jones & Ginther, 2015). Therefore it is 
likely that, over time and by repeated exposure to these explanations, perceptions of the 
origin of human behavior may shift from oriented in free-will to more biologically 
deterministic in nature (Shariff et al., 2014). As these views evolve, there will likely be 
implications on juror decision- making when arguments of moral and criminal 
responsibility are called into question (Eggen & Laury, 2012; Jones & Ginther, 2015; 
Weisberg et al. 2015). Both Shariff et al. (2014) and Scurich & Appelbaum (2015) 
empirically linked less free will beliefs and greater genetic or neuroscientific knowledge 
to more lenient punishment attitudes.  In Shariff et al.’s 2014 study, free will beliefs were 
manipulated across a series of experiments such that participants were presented with 
passages supporting a biologically based, mechanistic perspective on human behavior 
and subsequently asked to provide sentencing recommendations and criminal 
responsibility judgments for a hypothetical defendant involved in a criminal case. The 
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results indicated that not only did participants’ innate beliefs about free will predict a 
propensity for retributive punishment, but exposing participants to anti-free will 
arguments also diminished inclinations for retributive punishment. Furthermore, using a 
paired-sample comparison among students enrolled in a neuroscience course versus a 
geography course, Shariff et al. found that students enrolled in the neuroscience course 
reported a decrease in prison sentence recommendations from the beginning of the course 
to the end, while the geography course reported no change in recommendations. This 
decrease in sentence length recommendations for the students in the neuroscience course 
was strongly correlated with an increase in the students’ self-reported knowledge of the 
brain from the beginning of the course to the end. These results suggest that changes in 
philosophical beliefs about the origin of human behavior, and even learning about the 
brain, can initiate shifts in moral responsibility attitudes that can affect legal decision-
making.  
Similarly, Appelbaum and Scurich (2016) tested whether there were differences 
in the outcomes of criminal cases of different crime severity types when presenting 
participants with varying types of evidence supporting a mental illness (impulsivity/non-
scientific, genetic, neuroimage, or both neuroimage and genetic), while also measuring 
participants’ free will beliefs, knowledge of genetic information, and measures of the 
offender’s behavioral controllability. Across several studies, the authors found free will 
beliefs to be associated with harsher sentencing recommendations, while greater genetic 
knowledge generally produced more lenient sentencing outcomes. The authors go on to 
suggest that it was participants’ allegiance to beliefs about the controllability of criminal 
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behavior that had a greater effect on case outcomes than did the presentation of 
neuroscientific evidence.   
Controllability  
Researchers in legal decision-making platforms have measured behavior 
controllability as a contributor to judgments of criminal responsibility, but it is rarely a 
main topic of analysis (Appelbaum & Scurich, 2016; Cheung & Heine, 2015; Greene & 
Cahill, 2011; Schweitzer et al., 2013). This may stem from the fact that most research on 
mock-juror decision-making focuses on sentencing recommendations or judgments of 
responsibility, while controllability is typically viewed as an intermediate variable that is 
a contributor to those outcomes, but not of direct interest. As the introduction of 
neuroscientific information may meaningfully influence opinions about the genesis of 
human behavior, it therefore calls into question behavioral controllability that can be 
applied to criminal cases. For example, Greene and Cahill (2011) found the use of 
neuropsychological evidence most significantly contributed to participants’ opinions of 
behavioral controllability compared to neuroimaging or diagnosis only evidence, which 
in turn had a significant influence on sentencing recommendations. Schweitzer et al. 
(2011) cited exposure to neuroimage evidence supporting mental illness led to reduced 
judgments of behavioral control compared to psychological evidence supporting the same 
illness. Applebaum and Scurich (2016) noted that participant’s beliefs about 
controllability of criminal behavior were the most significant contributor to the 
sentencing outcomes of mock criminal cases. Cheung & Heine (2015) found in one study 
that genetic explanations for criminal behavior led to lower perceptions of the offender’s 
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conscious behavioral control, ultimately predicting more lenient sentencing 
recommendations. These studies demonstrate the importance of behavioral control as a 
contributor to sentencing outcomes and judgments of criminal responsibility. In addition 
to behavioral controllability as an instrumental intermediate measure in the case of 
mentally ill offenders, jurors may also look beyond the specific criminal act to the 
controllability of the illness origin itself.  This process introduces an entirely new set of 
schemes aimed at conceptualizing blame attribution, which are discussed below.  
Attribution Theory 
Because a number of individuals on trial for criminal activity possess mental 
defects as a result of both biological and behavioral anomalies with varying onset origins, 
discussion of the implications of those specific scenarios has resulted in a fair amount of 
discussion and related research. Attribution theory (Weiner, 2006) states that effort-
related causes for an indiscretion are viewed as more punishable than ability-related 
causes. Furthermore, it states that any stigmatizing condition with a behaviorally based 
origin is generally seen as more controllable by the individual who possesses the 
condition, and therefore are blamed more harshly for it, as opposed to a condition that is 
biologically based and seen as uncontrollable, resulting in less blame (Weiner, 2006). In 
fact, research suggests that physical and mental disorder onset controllability even affects 
helping behaviors and feelings of sympathy (Corrigan et al., 2003).  
Disorder onset controllability as a contributor to judgments of wrongdoers is a 
theory that has been empirically supported on numerous occasions (Corrigan et al., 2003; 
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Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, 1998; Reisenzein, 1986). For example, Weiner, Perry and 
Magnusson (1998) examined the extent to which the perceived controllability of the onset 
of a physical or mental disorder influenced judgments of an afflicted person. The authors 
found that those with defects that were considered onset-controllable, or self-inflicted, 
were judged more harshly than individuals with onset-uncontrollable defects. Similarly, a 
study by Corrigan et al. (2003) found that for individuals with an onset-controllable 
mental disorder, participants were more likely to withhold help and endorse coercive 
treatment compared to someone with the same mental disorder with an uncontrollable 
onset. Attribution Theory also makes note of disorder stability contributing to harsher 
judgments of blame, which in legal contexts is addressed by questions of likelihood to 
reoffend, dangerousness, and treatability. In sum, Attribution Theory reliably provides a 
framework upon which to analyze the process of attributing blame in general and legal 
circumstances, and the current study seeks to understand how it is implicated in situations 
where biologically based information is presented in cases of mentally ill criminal 
offenders.  
Preliminary Studies The discussed research demonstrates the importance of the 
perception of both behavioral control and disorder onset control in shaping judgments of 
criminal responsibility, and how those judgments are implicated by arguments advocating 
a biological basis for human behavior. However, there has been no study to date that 
attempts to uncover the precise mechanisms behind specifically how these circumstances 
interact and shape judgments. Before describing the analyses that serve as the topic of 
this paper, a series of precursory experiments were conducted that deserve explanation as 
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they served as stepping-stones that led to the current study. Those experiments are 
described below.  
 Based on previous literature indicating free will beliefs implicate the attribution of 
blame in criminal contexts, the first preliminary study aimed to uncover how these beliefs 
shape judgments of offenders with various mental deficits. Rather than measuring free 
will beliefs, a scale measuring beliefs in scientific determinism—or the belief that human 
behavior, attitudes, traits and behavior are caused and controlled by biologically based 
factors and prior environmental exposure—was utilized in an attempt to more accurately 
mirror the effects of how presenting biologically based information as evidence may 
shape these beliefs over time. Scientific determinism beliefs were measured using the 
FAD SD Subscale (from Paulhas & Margesson 1994), and judgments of criminal 
responsibility were obtained for an offender with one of four brain disorders: 1) Brain 
damage as a result of past drugs abuse, 2) Brain damage as a result of an automobile 
accident 3) Down’s Syndrome, 4) Parkinson’s Disease. From a sample of 815 community 
members, results indicated that those with lower SD scores endorsed more strict 
punishment for the drug abuse, or onset controllable condition, while higher SD scores 
endorsed more punishment for Parkinson’s and Down’s syndrome, or onset 
uncontrollable disorders.  
 In that same study, participants were also asked to provide judgments about 21 
different mental disorders or social conditions along two dimensions: first, how much 
each of the disorders/conditions might be the result of factors that are within a person’s 
control (Controllability); and second the extent to which each disorder/condition would 
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lessen a hypothetical offender’s responsibility for committing a crime (Responsibility). 
Disorders were chosen so that they would represent a wide range of onset controllability 
and were conditions/situations that may be used as mitigating circumstances in legal 
proceedings. Results indicated that for disorders that could be considered controllable, 
high SD scores predicted more leniency in judgments of Responsibility than low SD 
scores. Unexpectedly, for uncontrollable disorders, high SD scores predicted harsher 
judgments of Responsibility and those participants judged the onset of the disorder as 
more controllable than those with low SD scores. These results suggest that the aspect of 
the disorder that produces this paradoxical interaction is the extent to which the onset of 
the disorder is believed to be within the person’s control.  
 In light of the perplexing results of the first study, a second study attempted to 
replicate and experimentally manipulate deterministic views. Utilizing a 2x2 between-
subjects design, participants were presented with a one-sentence prime, which suggested 
that the origin of human behavior is either A) biologically predetermined (Bio Prime) or 
B) based in free will (Non Bio Prime). Participants were provided a summary of a 
hypothetical criminal case describing an offender who possessed either A) an onset - 
uncontrollable disorder (congenial brain damage) or B) an onset-controllable disorder 
(paranoid delusions as a result of previous drug use), and prior to offering their 
judgments presented with one of the two aforementioned Primes. A sample of 413 
participants revealed the same backfire effect from Study 1: When the disorder was 
onset-controllable, the Bio Prime provided more lenient judgments of responsibility, but 
resulted in harsher judgments for the onset-uncontrollable disorder.  
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 The third study attempted to uncover whether the biological explanations would 
produce the same backfire effect when provided as an explanation for a mental disorder 
(Biomechanism), in addition to a biological explanation for human behavior in general, 
as was observed in the previous studies. Utilizing a 4 (Disorder Onset: Brain Damage as a 
result of self-starvation behavior or drug abuse [Fault disorders] versus brain damage as a 
result of parental neglect or congenial birth defect [Not at Fault disorders]) x 2 (Disorder 
Biomechanism: Bio versus Non Bio) x 2 (Human Nature Prime: Bio versus Non Bio) 
between-subjects design, ratings of Dangerousness, Likelihood of Reoffending and 
Sentence Recommendations were obtained for an offender who committed a hypothetical 
crime. This study again found the elusive backfire interaction effect, but only between the 
Human Nature Prime and Disorder Onset on Likelihood of Reoffending and Sentence 
Recommendations: The Human Nature Prime mitigated sentence recommendations and 
produced lower ratings of Likelihood of Reoffending for the At Fault disorders, but 
produced the opposite effect for Not at Fault disorders.  
 The results of the preliminary studies demonstrate the persistent findings of a 
perplexing interaction between disorder onset and an argument supporting biological 
basis for human behavior on judgments of criminal responsibility.  It seems that, across 
several studies, a statement supporting biologically deterministic beliefs results in more 
lenient judgments of responsibility when an offender’s mental disability has a self-
inflicted origin, and harsher when it has an uncontrollable origin. As a potential 
explanation to how recurrent exposure to information grounded in biological principles 
alters the attribution of criminal responsibility, sometimes backfiring and producing 
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negative evaluations, the current study sought to uncover mediators to account for these 
interactions found in the preliminary studies. This study’s aim was therefore to explore 
how measured perceptions of offender dangerousness, likelihood to reoffend, treatability, 
and behavior controllability account for the interaction between disorder onset 
controllability and a biologically based explanation for human behavior on judgments of 
criminal responsibility and sentence recommendations.  
Methodology 
 
Participants 
 
Two hundred forty-six U.S. participants completed the study online via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Prior to beginning our analyses we took a series of steps to validate the 
data by removing any participants who scored below a 75% on our attention check 
questions. After eliminating nineteen participants by those standards, the final sample 
included two hundred twenty-seven people (59% male; mean age = 34 years; 71% 
Caucasian; 40% held at least four-year college degree). 
Materials/Procedure 
A 2 (Prime: Bio versus Non Bio) x 2 (Disorder onset: Fault versus No Fault) 
between subjects experimental design was utilized, where participants were first told they 
would be presented with a case summary detailing a crime and then asked to provide 
their judgments about the case (See Appendix for full survey with case summaries). The 
summary described an incident that took place in a grocery store where, as recorded by 
surveillance video, the defendant violently assaulted another man after being accidentally 
bumped with the man’s cart. The scenario went on to explain that during the offender’s 
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trial, an expert witness for the defense testified that the offender possessed a brain deficit 
(named “LPFC Deficit”), which can cause individuals to act irrationally and diminishes 
one’s ability to control his/her behavior. The disorder was ambiguously named the LPFC 
deficit as to avoid any stigma or preconceptions associated with well-known disorders 
that may be considered by the participants and affect judgments.  
The participants were then informed that the offender’s disorder was caused by 
one of two randomly assigned Disorder Onset conditions: either malnourishment as a 
result of the defendant engaging in severe starvation behaviors to make weight in his high 
school wrestling competitions, coded the “Fault” condition, or malnourishment as a result 
of parental negligence during early childhood, coded the “No Fault” condition. Lastly, 
the participants are presented with a statement designed to either advocate biological 
determinism, or a biological basis for human behavior in general (Bio Prime), or 
advocating for non-biological factors/free will as the basis for human behavior (Non Bio 
Prime). These statements were described to participants as testimony by an expert 
witness reminding them that either: “human behavior is entirely based in biology” (Bio 
Prime) or “entirely not based in biology and within your own control” (Non Bio Prime).   
After reading the case summary and Prime, participants were asked to provide 
ratings on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “completely” on several 
randomized questions about the defendant’s culpability and perceived behavior 
controllability (1 = not at all…10 = completely). For example, one question reads: 
“Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statement: ‘The defendant 
could have controlled his behavior at the time of the crime’.” Our primary outcome 
measure was the amount of Criminal Responsibility that should be attributed to the 
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offender, while other measures intended to function as potential mediators included: the 
amount of control the defendant could have had over his behavior at the time of the crime 
(Could Control), Likelihood of Reoffending, offender Treatability and Dangerousness. 
These questions were followed by a sentencing recommendation as to how long (in 
months and years), if any, the offender should be incarcerated. Included in the measures 
was also a manipulation check question to ensure that the Disorder Onset manipulation 
was successful in that the disorder intended to be viewed as the defendant’s fault was 
actually viewed that way by participants. This question asked, “Based on what you know 
about the defendant’s disorder, do you believe the defendant was in a any way at fault for 
getting his disorder in the first place?” Following these questions we collected 
demographic information and thanked participants for their completion of the study (See 
Appendix B for complete survey).  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Between-subjects analysis of variance on Disorder Onset determined that the 
disorder that was meant to be viewed as the offender’s Fault (M = 6.68) was viewed that 
way by participants, compared to the No Fault (M = 3.16) condition (0 ratings = 
completely not at fault, 10 = completely at fault): F(1, 224) = 93.94, p < .001 η2 = .295.  
Criminal Responsibility 
For the primary outcome measure, Criminal Responsibility, a significant main 
effect of Disorder Onset emerged, F(1, 223) = 5.03, p < .03, η2 = .02, where ratings of 
Criminal Responsibility were higher overall in the Fault condition compared to the No 
Fault condition.  The main effect of Prime on Criminal Responsibility was non-
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significant, F(1, 223) = .36, p = .55, η2 = .002. Simple effects tests revealed that when the 
Non Bio Prime was presented, there was a significant difference between Disorder Onset 
conditions, F(1, 115) = 12.46, p < .001, η2 = .10, however there were no differences 
across Disorder Onset conditions when the Bio Prime was presented, F(1, 108) = .10,      
p = .75, η2 = .001. There was a significant interaction between Prime and Disorder Onset, 
F(1, 223) = 7.26, p = .01, η2 = .30, as expected (See Figure 1). This interaction reveals 
that presentation of the Bio Prime resulted in lower ratings of Criminal Responsibility for 
the Fault condition (non-significant), F(1,111) = 2.09, p = .15, η2 = .02,  but higher 
ratings in the No Fault condition, F(1, 112) = 5.71, p = .02, η2 = .05, consistent with the 
interactions observed in the preliminary studies. (See Table 1 for mean scores and 
standard deviations).  
 
Table 1. Mean ratings of Criminal Responsibility across Prime and 
Disorder Onset conditions. 
 
 
Prime 
 
Fault Condition 
 
No Fault Condition 
 
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
Non Bio Prime 
 
8.88 
 
1.67 
 
7.59 
 
2.20 
 
Bio Prime 
 
8.02 
 
2.12 
 
8.13 
 
1.73 
 
Total 
 
8.44 
 
2.00 
 
7.84 
 
2.00 
 
Main effects of mediators  
Prior to conducting mediation analyses, we ran a series of 2x2 ANOVAs between 
our IVs— Prime and Disorder Onset—on each of the mediator variables. A marginally 
significant interaction emerged between Prime and Onset Condition on ratings of 
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offender Treatability, F(1, 223) = 3.40, p = .07, η2= .02, displaying the same pattern as 
observed in the main interaction: in the No Fault condition, presentation of the Bio Prime  
elicited higher ratings of Criminal Responsibility compared to when the Non Bio Prime 
was presented; while in the Fault condition the Bio Prime resulted in lower ratings 
compared to the Non Bio Prime. No significant main effects for Treatability ratings 
emerged (all p’s > .50). For ratings of offender Dangerousness, results revealed a 
significant main effect of Prime, F(1, 223) = 3.79, p = .05, η2= .02, where the Bio Prime 
produced the highest ratings across all conditions. Dangerousness produced no significant 
main effect of Onset Condition (p = .80), nor was there a significant interaction effect    
(p = .40). For Likelihood to Reoffend, there was a marginally significant main effect of 
Prime, F(1, 223) = 2.50, p = .12, η2= .00, indicating higher ratings of Likelihood to 
Reoffend overall when the Bio Prime was presented, highest in No Fault condition. The 
interaction between Prime and Onset Condition was non-significant (p = .67), and the 
main effect of Onset Condition was non-significant (p = .38). For ratings of how much 
the offender could have controlled his behavior at the time of the crime (Could Control), 
results revealed a marginally significant main effect of Prime, F(1, 223) = 3.26, p = .07, 
η2 = .014, and a  significant interaction between Prime and Disorder Onset, F(1, 223) = 
3.97, p = .05, η2 = .02. The main effect of Disorder Onset was non-significant (p = .58). 
Because these mediator variables may have all tapped into similar feelings regarding the 
participants’ judgments about disorder stability and the offender’s future behavior, a 
series of correlations were conducted between the variables, listed below (see Table 2). 
The correlation analyses revealed the variable Could Control was significantly positively 
correlated with all of the other mediator variables: Treatability (r = .36), Dangerousness 
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(r = .19), and Likelihood to Reoffend (r = .21) (all p’s < .01). Dangerousness was also 
highly positively correlated with Likelihood to Reoffend (r = .66, p < .01).  
 
Table 2. Correlations between Mediator variables 
 Treatability Dangerousness Reoffend 
Could 
Control 
Treatability 
 
 
Correlation 1 -.078 -.018 .362** 
Sig.   .243 .788 .000 
N 227 227 227 227 
Dangerousness Correlation -.078 1 .661** .193** 
Sig.  .243  .000 .004 
N 227 227 227 227 
Reoffend Correlation -.018 .661** 1 .211** 
Sig.  .788 .000  .001 
N 227 227 227 227 
Could Control Correlation .362** .193** .211** 1 
Sig.  .000 .004 .001  
N 227 227 227 227 
** p < .01 
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Figure 1. Displays Prime x Disorder Onset Interaction on  
Criminal Responsibility Ratings *p < .05
 
 
Indirect Effects Analysis 
To try and elucidate the interaction between Disorder Onset and Prime on 
Criminal Responsibility ratings, indirect effects analyses were conducted (Hayes, 2013). 
The variables predicted to mediate this interaction—Treatability, Dangerousness, 
Likelihood to Reoffend, and Could Control— were individually tested as mediators in the 
model. Neither Treatability (ab = .28, 95% CI: [-.002. .72]), Dangerousness (ab = .14, 
95% CI: [-.17, .48]) or Likelihood to Reoffend (ab =  -.04, 95% CI: [-.23, .14] returned 
significant indirect effects when used as mediators in moderated mediation analyses 
(Model 8). Could Control was the only variable to successfully account for the interaction 
6 
6.5 
7 
7.5 
8 
8.5 
9 
9.5 
Fault No Fault 
Criminal  
Responsibility 
Disorder Onset Condition 
Bio Prime 
Non Bio 
Prime 
		*	
 ns 
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effect between Prime and Disorder Onset on Criminal Responsibility:	ab = .59, 95% CI: 
[.03, 1.24] (See Figure 2). Pathway A in the mediation produced a significant interaction 
between Prime and Disorder Onset (a = 1.25, 95% CI: [.01, 2.49]) on Could Control, a 
significant negative effect of Prime on Could Control (a = -1.19, 95% CI: [-2.06, -.32]), 
and a significant negative effect of Disorder Onset (a = -.80, 95% CI: [.01, 2.5]). 
Conditional indirect effects indicate a negative indirect effect of Prime on Criminal 
Responsibility through Could Control in the Fault condition (ab = -.57, 95% CI: [-1.06,   
-.19]), while in the No Fault condition, no significant indirect effect emerged  (ab = .03, 
95% CI: [-.41, .46]).  These mediation effects are consistent with the effects observed in 
the initial 2x2 ANOVA performed on the data, but establish perceived behavioral control 
as an indirect pathway accounting for how Criminal Responsibility is attributed at both 
levels of the Disorder Onset conditions.  
Sentence Length 
Analysis of recommended Sentence Length revealed that across the entire sample, 
the mean recommended sentence was 37.11 months (median = 18 months, mode = 24 
months), with those who recommended zero months included in the analysis. Not 
including those participants who recommended zero months of punishment, the overall 
mean was 41.61 months. The No Fault condition returned overall lower sentence length 
recommendations (M = 34.92, SE = 10.22) compared to the Fault condition (M = 48.30, 
SE = 10.02), however this difference was not statistically significant, F(1, 198) = .87,          
p = .35, η2 = .000. There was not a significant effect of Prime on Sentence Length,  
F(1, 198) = .001,  p = .98, η2 = .004, or a significant interaction between Prime and 
Disorder Onset F(1, 198) = .35, p = .55, η2 = .002.  
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Figure 2. The Moderated Mediation Analysis  
Coding: Non Bio Prime = 0, Bio Prime = 1 
*p < .05 
 
 
 
Emotion-eliciting variables 
 In addition to analysis of possible mediators for the interaction between the Prime 
and Disorder Onset on ratings of Criminal Responsibility, the study also obtained 
measures designed to analyze the participants’ feelings of anger, sadness, fear and disgust 
as a result of the defendant’s behavior. These variables were measured on a scale ranging 
from 1-5, with higher scores indicating stronger feelings of that emotion. Although none 
of these variables produced significant main effects when tested against Prime and 
Disorder Onset (all p’s > .40; see Table 3), their mean scores across conditions indicated 
that presentation of the Bio Prime returned slightly higher ratings overall compared to the 
Non Bio Prime for variables indicating the offender’s behavior made participants feel 
Sad, Angry, and Fearful.  
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Table 3.  Mean Scores for Emotion Eliciting Variables  
Scale 1-5, higher scores indicate greater experience of that emotion 
 
The 
defendant’s 
behavior 
makes me 
feel…  
Mean score 
Prime 
 
Main effect  
 
Prime 
Mean Score 
Disorder Onset 
 
Main effect 
 
Disorder 
Onset 
Bio  
Prime 
Non  
Bio 
 
No Fault 
 
Fault 
Sad  3.6 
 
3.4 p = .40 
 
3.6 3.4 p = .33 
Angry 3.6 3.5 p = .42 3.6 3.5 p = .68 
Disgusted 3.4 3.5 p = .82 3.4 3.4 p = .99 
Fearful 3.4 3.2 p = .52 3.3 3.3 p = .65 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 The current study explored the effects of presenting an argument supporting a 
biological basis for human behavior on judgments of criminal responsibility for an 
offender with a mental disorder with varying onset conditions. As expected, based on our 
preliminary studies, the presentation of the biologically based prime resulted in decreased 
judgments of criminal responsibility in the Fault condition, when the disorder’s onset was 
controllable, and had the opposite effect in the No Fault condition, when the onset was 
uncontrollable. An exploration of possible mediators for this effect revealed that the 
perception of control the offender could have had over his behavior at the time of the 
crime accounted for the relationship described above. These results suggest that both 
disorder onset controllability and behavior controllability contribute to judgments of 
criminal responsibility for mentally ill offenders, and biologically based arguments affect 
those perceptions of control differently.  
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When attempting to explain this effect, Weiner’s Attribution Theory (2006) 
provides a partial explanation for the results. Attribution Theory states that effort-related 
causes for failure are viewed as more punishable than ability-related causes, and 
disorders with a behaviorally based origin are seen as more controllable and result in 
more blame attribution than a biologically based disorder (Weiner, 2006). The fact that 
the criminal responsibility ratings were higher overall for the Fault disorder is consistent 
with Attribution Theory—onset controllable disorders were viewed as behaviorally based 
and effort related, therefore eliciting greater blame attribution for the indiscretion. 
However, presenting a biologically deterministic prime for that same disorder appears to 
have changed the blame attribution from behaviorally based and effort related, to 
biologically based and ability related, therefore decreasing criminal responsibility ratings. 
This change resulted in a shift in the perception of control the offender had over both the 
acquisition of his disorder and his behavior at the time of the crime—explained by the 
variable Could Control mediating the relationship between Disorder Onset, the Biological 
Prime, and Criminal Responsibility.  
The mediating variable, Could Control, was significantly correlated with all other 
hypothesized mediator variables: Dangerousness, Likelihood to Reoffend, and 
Treatability. This suggests that although Could Control was the only variable to 
statistically account for the relationship between Prime and Disorder Onset on ratings of 
Criminal Responsibility, it is likely that the other variables were similarly affected by our 
manipulation and may have contributed to responsibility judgments to a lesser degree. It 
is also possible that because the crime scenario provided to participants was a very brief 
description of an assault case, the lack of detail and emotional arousal failed to elicit 
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stronger opinions about Reoffending, Treatability, and Dangerousness.  A future study 
that provided more comprehensive information to participants about the offender and 
possibly a more emotionally salient crime may more significantly provoke those 
opinions.  
Attribution Theory also asserts that behavior stability is a contributing element to 
judgments of wrongdoers in all contexts. The current study provides support for this idea, 
as two variables that measured behavior stability were highly correlated: Dangerousness 
and Likelihood to Reoffend. Although neither variable significantly affected Criminal 
Responsibility ratings, both produced significant main effects in response to the Prime: 
presenting the Biological Prime resulted in higher ratings of Dangerousness and 
Likelihood to Reoffend, suggesting that a biological explanation for human behavior in 
general results in increased perceptions of behavior stability. These results support the 
notion that behavior stability is comparably utilized in criminal contexts, and an 
argument supporting biological determinism can alter those judgments in a way not 
beneficial to the offender. It’s possible then that individuals who advocate a more 
deterministic world-view are more prone to seeing behavior as stable compared to those 
with perspectives rooted in free will.  
Although the emotion eliciting variables did not significantly predict sentencing 
or responsibility judgments, a pattern was present that indicates the presence of the 
Biological Prime resulted in more fear, sadness, and anger in response to the offender’s 
behavior. It is possible that the presentation of a biologically deterministic argument 
triggers those emotions and contributes to the increase in Criminal Responsibility 
judgments for an offender with an onset controllable (Fault) disorder. As these variables 
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were non-significantly affected by the manipulation of the study, only speculative 
judgments can be made. However, it seems likely that had the crime scenario been more 
emotionally salient, it may have produced stronger emotional responses from the 
participants, potentially returning significant effects. Future studies should attempt to 
address this concern in a similar context. 
It is also worth noting the finding that there were no differences in sentencing 
recommendations across the conditions. This finding, consistent with much research in 
mock juror decision-making in general, represents the attitudes addressed by the precise 
manipulation of conditions and the use of survey data in general. It seems that, by 
focusing on criminal responsibility as a primary measure that does not directly 
correspond with differences in sentencing recommendations, we are instead addressing 
intermediate attitudes that may contribute to bigger-picture judgments like sentencing, 
but in conjunction with various other factors and attitudes.   
 Though Attribution Theory provides an intuitive framework to explain the results 
of one side of our experiment, there is still a piece of this puzzle missing. When the 
offender’s disorder was onset uncontrollable, according to Attribution Theory and our 
expected interpretation, the biological prime should result in ability related attribution 
and therefore lower responsibility ratings. However, it does just the opposite. It is still 
unclear why, for disorders with an uncontrollable origin, the biological prime essentially 
backfires and produces greater attributions of criminal responsibility. It is possible that 
the use of biological explanations in criminal contexts only go so far. Perhaps for onset 
uncontrollable, ability-related conditions, information that reiterates its biologically based 
nature could serve as a harsh reminder of the permanence of such a condition, implicitly 
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eliciting fear and leading to harsher responsibility ratings. Another potential explanation 
for these unclear findings is that Attribution Theory does not support a more biologically 
deterministic perspective on human behavior, elicited by presentation of the biologically 
based argument, in the context of blame attribution for criminal offenders. This 
philosophical perspective could require the agency of factors not represented by 
Attribution Theory. Therefore, whether this theory can be applied to the specific 
circumstances elicited in the current study is still unknown and should be the focus of 
future analyses.  
 Thus far in the interpretation of the results obtained in this study, the focus has 
been on the differential effect presenting the Prime had on Criminal Responsibility 
ratings across Disorder Onset conditions. Specifically, that the Prime resulted in more 
harsh responsibility judgments in the No Fault condition, and less harsh in the Fault 
condition compared to when the Non Bio Prime was presented. However, it may be 
beneficial to shift the perception of this interaction: There is a statistical difference in 
Criminal Responsibility attributions between Disorder Onset conditions when the Non 
Bio Prime advocating free will is presented—the Fault disorder is attributed more 
responsibility than the No Fault disorder. However, when the Bio Prime advocating 
biological determinism is presented, that difference across conditions disappears. This 
may suggest that for individuals whose beliefs are more deterministic in nature, criminal 
responsibility attributions may remain constant regardless of the details of a disorder’s 
onset controllability. On the other hand, for those who advocate free will, onset 
controllability is a sensitive piece of information that alters responsibility attribution. 
Overall, the details of this study support the concept that an individual’s philosophical 
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beliefs about the origin of human behavior affect how one uses the details of a criminal 
offender to produce responsibility attributions.  
There are limitations of this study that should be addressed. First, some suggest 
internet-based mock-juror research may lack ecological validity and therefore should be 
considered with caution when applying it to juror decision-making in real trial scenarios. 
However, recent research demonstrated the use of mock-juror data across both student 
and non-student sample returned consistent sentencing and responsibility judgments 
across over fifty experiments, demonstrating mock-jury research platforms to be a 
reliable method of data collection (Bornstein et al. 2017). Second, though Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) provides a statistically representative sample of the general 
US population, it is not a truly random sample. However, recent studies assert that 
MTurk provides an acceptable alternative to in-person experimental designs, many times 
with a more nationally representative sample and lower likelihood of experimenter biases 
(Berinsky, Huber & Lenz 2012; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010).  
Implications of this research include informing attorneys and other legal decision 
makers the possible effect presenting biologically based evidence may have on their 
client’s case. It is important for the legal community to be aware of the possible negative 
outcomes that may arise as a result of introducing such evidence in cases of mentally ill 
offenders. Specifically, the presentation of biologically based evidence utilized with the 
hopes of mitigating sentencing or judgments of guilt may, in certain circumstances, 
produce the opposite effect. Precisely when these arguments are beneficial or not may 
involve perceptions of the offender’s behavioral control, however this theory would 
benefit from further exploration. This research also demonstrates that exposure to 
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biologically deterministic arguments have the ability to affect perceptions of 
responsibility for crimes committed by a mentally ill offender. This may represent a 
societal shift in the perception of free will as a result of increased exposure to and 
awareness of biology in general. In the future, the paradoxical backfire effect present in 
this study should be explored to further solidify why and when presenting biologically 
based evidence is beneficial, and when it is detrimental in legal cases.  
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Hello, 
 
We are researchers at Arizona State University, and we would like to invite you to 
participate in a short study on how jurors evaluate evidence in a legal case. This will 
involve reading a short description of a potentially criminal act, and then answering 
questions about your opinions. You will not be able to refer back to the description once 
you're finished with that page. There is no time limit, so please take your time and 
carefully review the information presented.  
 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You have the right not to answer any 
questions, and to stop participating at any time. If you choose not to participate or to 
withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no penalty.  
 
If you decide to participate, we expect the study to take you about 10-12 minutes. 
Although there may be no direct benefits to you, the possible benefits of your 
participation in the research include the opportunity to be involved in and learn about 
research. There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. You must be 
18 or older to participate in the study. 
 
All information obtained in this study is strictly confidential and your responses will be 
anonymous. The anonymous data are stored on a password protected computer hard disk 
in a secure location so that only the principle investigator and research assistants will 
have access to it. The results of this research may be used in reports, presentations, and 
publications, but the researchers will not identify you. 
 
If you have any questions concerning this study, please contact the research team via 
email at laclab@asu.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a 
subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can 
contact the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board through the ASU Office of 
Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. 
 
By advancing to the next page, you are consenting to participate in the study.  Please 
click the "NEXT" button to proceed with the survey. 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate. We very much appreciate your help. 
  
We'd like you to read a brief summary of an actual criminal court case. Although it will 
give you only a very superficial idea of what happened in this trial, we will be asking you 
to then provide your impressions and judgments about the case. 
 
We ask that you please take your time and carefully read the summary and the questions 
that follow. 
  
When you are ready, click the NEXT button below to view the Case Summary. 
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Case Summary 
  
This case is about a 35-year-old male who was arrested for assault.  
  
Background: The victim and the defendant were both shopping at a local grocery store 
that was quite busy. The victim, a 38-year-old male, was walking down the grocery aisle 
when he accidentally bumped into the defendant with his shopping cart. The defendant 
turned to the victim and shouted angrily, "Watch where you are going!"  A few minutes 
later, the victim accidentally bumped into the defendant again. This time, the defendant 
turned toward the victim and, without saying anything, began to punch the victim 
repeatedly until bystanders stepped in and stopped the assault. The grocery store had 
surveillance cameras that caught the entire incident on tape. There were also many 
eyewitnesses including those who stopped the assault. The surveillance recording showed 
that the victim laid motionless for roughly 30 seconds. The emergency room physician 
who treated the victim stated that he had been rendered unconscious due to repeated 
blows to the head and that he also suffered additional minor injuries when he fell to the 
ground. The victim has now fully recovered from all of his injuries. 
  
Defense Evidence: During the trial, a medical expert testified that, upon extensive 
examination, the defendant was found to have a neurological (brain) disorder called an 
LPFC Deficit. This disorder can cause individuals to act irrationally and diminishes a 
person's ability to control his or her behavior. After extensive review of the defendant’s 
past medical records the expert found that the defendant suffered from extreme 
malnutrition during his early childhood. From the time he was born until he was five 
years old the defendant’s mother severely neglected him and did not feed him or care for 
him properly. The expert testified that this malnutrition is likely what led to the 
defendant's LPFC deficit.  
  
Expert Evidence: A scientific expert in human behavior was assigned to the case and 
explained that, to truly understand human behavior, it is necessary to remember the 
critical role played by biological factors. Extensive research has found that there are 
unique genes and biological processes involved in the development of all mental 
disorders. Other research has shown that humans possess genes, chemical markers, and 
brain structures that account for behaviors such as impulsivity, aggression, and risk-
taking. The expert advised the jury to keep in mind that it is these types of biological 
factors that ultimately cause a person’s choices and actions, both good and bad. 
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Case Summary 
  
The defendant is a 35 year-old male who is charged with assault. 
  
Background: The victim and the defendant were both shopping at a local grocery store 
that was quite busy. The victim, a 38-year-old male, was walking down the grocery aisle 
when he accidentally bumped into the defendant with his shopping cart. The defendant 
turned to the victim and shouted angrily, "Watch where you are going!"  A few minutes 
later, the victim accidentally bumped into the defendant again. This time, the defendant 
turned toward the victim and, without saying anything, began to punch the victim 
repeatedly until bystanders stepped in and stopped the assault. The grocery store had 
surveillance cameras that caught the entire incident on tape. There were also many 
eyewitnesses including those who stopped the assault. The surveillance recording showed 
that the victim lay motionless for roughly 30 seconds. The emergency room physician 
who treated the victim stated that the victim had been rendered unconscious due to 
repeated blows to the head and that he also suffered additional minor injuries when he 
fell to the ground. The victim has now fully recovered from all of his injuries. 
 
  
Defense Evidence:  During the trial, a medical expert testified that, upon extensive 
examination, the defendant was found to have a neurological (brain) disorder called an 
LPFC Deficit. This disorder can cause individuals to act irrationally and diminishes a 
person's ability to control his or her behavior. After extensive review of the defendant’s 
past medical records the expert found that the defendant suffered from extreme 
malnutrition during his early childhood. From the time he was born until he was five 
years old the defendant’s mother was negligent and did not feed him or care for him 
properly. The expert testified that this malnutrition is what likely led to the defendant's 
LPFC deficit.  
  
   
Expert Evidence: A scientific expert in human behavior was assigned to the case and 
explained that, to truly understand human behavior, it is necessary to remember the 
critical role played by an individual’s choices and desires. We all have our own 
experiences, perceptions, and emotions that shape our beliefs and contribute to our 
behavior. Extensive research has shown that mental disorders, temperaments and 
personality types are often not caused by genetics or biology; rather it is our own actions 
and experiences that cause us to be who we are. The expert advised the jury to keep in 
mind that it is a person’s own choices that govern their behavior, and biological factors 
are not the ultimate cause of a person’s choices and actions, good or bad. 
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Case Summary 
  
The defendant is a 35 year-old male who is charged with assault. 
  
Background: The victim and the defendant were both shopping at a local grocery store 
that was quite busy. The victim, a 38-year-old male, was walking down the grocery aisle 
when he accidentally bumped into the defendant with his shopping cart. The defendant 
turned to the victim and shouted angrily, "Watch where you are going!"  A few minutes 
later, the victim accidentally bumped into the defendant again. This time, the defendant 
turned toward the victim and, without saying anything, began to punch the victim 
repeatedly until bystanders stepped in and stopped the assault. The grocery store had 
surveillance cameras that caught the entire incident on tape. There were also many 
eyewitnesses including those who stopped the assault. The surveillance recording showed 
that the victim lay motionless for roughly 30 seconds. The emergency room physician 
who treated the victim stated that the victim had been rendered unconscious due to 
repeated blows to the head and that he also suffered additional minor injuries when he 
fell to the ground. The victim has now fully recovered from all of his injuries. 
  
  
Defense Evidence: During the trial, a medical expert testified that, upon extensive 
examination, the defendant was found to have a neurological (brain) disorder called an 
LPFC Deficit. This disorder can cause individuals to act irrationally and diminishes a 
person's ability to control his or her behavior. After extensive review of the defendant’s 
past medical records the expert found that the defendant suffered from extreme 
malnutrition during adolescence due to frequent starvation diets to maintain a certain 
weight for the purpose of competing in high school wrestling competitions. The 
defendant admitted that he secretly chose to go on extreme 'diets' despite warnings from 
his wrestling coach and parents that it was dangerous and unhealthy. The expert testified 
that this malnutrition is what likely led to the defendant's LPFC deficit. 
  
  
Expert Evidence: A scientific expert in human behavior was assigned to the case and 
explained that, to truly understand human behavior, it is necessary to remember the 
critical role played by biological factors. Extensive research has found that there are 
unique genes and biological processes involved in the development of all mental 
disorders. Other research has shown that humans possess genes, chemical markers, and 
brain structures that account for behaviors such as impulsivity, aggression, and risk-
taking. The expert advised the jury to keep in mind that it is these types of biological 
factors that ultimately cause a person’s choices and actions, both good and bad. 
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Case Summary 
  
The defendant is a 35 year-old male who is charged with assault. 
  
Background: The victim and the defendant were both shopping at a local grocery store 
that was quite busy. The victim, a 38-year-old male, was walking down the grocery aisle 
when he accidentally bumped into the defendant with his shopping cart. The defendant 
turned to the victim and shouted angrily, "Watch where you are going!"  A few minutes 
later, the victim accidentally bumped into the defendant again. This time, the defendant 
turned toward the victim and, without saying anything, began to punch the victim 
repeatedly until bystanders stepped in and stopped the assault. The grocery store had 
surveillance cameras that caught the entire incident on tape. There were also many 
eyewitnesses including those who stopped the assault. The surveillance recording showed 
that the victim lay motionless for roughly 30 seconds. The emergency room physician 
who treated the victim stated that the victim had been rendered unconscious due to 
repeated blows to the head and that he also suffered additional minor injuries when he 
fell to the ground. The victim has now fully recovered from all of his injuries. 
  
  
Defense Evidence: During the trial, a medical expert testified that, upon extensive 
examination, the defendant was found to have a neurological (brain) disorder called an 
LPFC Deficit. This disorder can cause individuals to act irrationally and diminishes a 
person's ability to control his or her behavior. After extensive review of the defendant’s 
past medical records the expert found that the defendant suffered from extreme 
malnutrition during adolescence due to frequent starvation diets to maintain a certain 
weight for the purpose of competing in high school wrestling competitions. The 
defendant admitted that he secretly chose to go on extreme 'diets' despite warnings from 
his wrestling coach and parents that it was dangerous and unhealthy. The expert testified 
that this malnutrition is what likely led to the defendant's LPFC deficit.  
  
 
Expert Evidence: A scientific expert in human behavior was assigned to the case and 
explained that, to truly understand human behavior, it is necessary to remember the 
critical role played by an individual’s choices and desires. We all have our own 
experiences, perceptions, and emotions that shape our beliefs and contribute to our 
behavior. Extensive research has shown that mental disorders, temperaments and 
personality types are often not caused by genetics or biology; rather it is our own actions 
and experiences that cause us to be who we are. The expert advised the jury to keep in 
mind that it is a person’s own choices that govern their behavior, and biological factors 
are not the ultimate cause of a person’s choices and actions, good or bad. 				
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Questions:  
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